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What is the relationship, if any, between the movement toward democracy 
in Korea and the high levels of economic development achieved there?* 
One obvious conclusion that arises from a consideration of the Korean 
case is that the relationship is not the one identified in the Western theory 
of '%ourgeoisU revolutions. It is questionable whether economic develop- 
ment in Korea has produced a genuine middle class and, even if it has, the 
Korean middle class does not have an interest in and demonstrably has not 
championed political democracy during the first five Korean republics. 
The Korean developmental state is not antagonistic to the interests of the 
entrepreneurial-managerial elite in Korea, and it is thus meaningless to 
speak of a private sector favoring democracy as a way of controlling the 
public sector. Korea's possessing class is not a ruling class in the Marxist 
sense; it is rather the collaborator of a military-bureaucratic elite in a joint 
project of nationalist development. This configuration of political econ- 
omy is quite compatible with authoritarian government for extended 
periods of time. 
But there is a relationship between economic development and the ad- 
vent of democracy in the Korea of the 1980s. Economic development 
caused conditions that in social science theory are called societal dise- 
qulibrium. The demands for democracy of the 1980s constituted efforts to 
resynchronize the Korean value structure with its division of labor and to 
overcome the sense of injustice and unfairness that Koreans felt in the 
1980s but not in the 1960s.' 
Korea's strategy of economic development, modeled after that of Japan, 
resulted in a pattern of markedly unbalanced development: high levels of 
economic development, significant levels of social development, and low 
levels of political development. This imbalance is particularly serious in 
cases where the strategy has produced great success in terms of its original 
premises - such as the case of Korea. 
An unintended consequence of the strategy is a loss of societal equilibri- 
um, that is, a loss of coherence between a society's structure of values 
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and its division of labor. Depending on the appropriateness or irrelevance 
of the policies advanced by the political elites to deal with the imbalance, 
a genuine revolutionary situation may be created. This is what happened 
in Korea as a result of Chun's policies of military repression and the 24th 
Olympiad. Nonetheless, the fact that the student revolutionaries suc- 
ceeded in driving Chun from office and launching the sixth republic 
should not be thought of as an inevitable or determined outcome. Revolu- 
tionary situations are only that - opportunities for change. In real life, and 
contrary to Marx, the forces of reaction often win and the forces of progress 
often lose. Fortunately for Korea, the outcome of its revolutionary confron- 
tation was the foundation of political democracy. 
Does the degree of economic development achieved in Taiwan and 
South Korea explain the timing of their movements toward democracy? Do 
their high degrees of economic development offer propitious circum- 
stances for the establishment of democracy? Despite the contrary cases of 
Japan, where democracy seems to recede as the nation gets richer, and In- 
dia, the Philippines, Costa Rica, and Colombia, where economic pros- 
perity has not accompanied democracy, many observers think there is a 
positive correlation between economic growth and democracy. John T. 
Bennett, after some initial reluctance, accepts that "economic growth, at 
least that which is widely shared, promotes democracy"; and he quotes 
the Wall Streetlournal in commenting on Korea's new democracy, "You can't 
sustain economic growth over the long run without relaxing political res- 
trictions.'" These views reflect in part the Western theory that the emer- 
gence of a true bourgeoisie (literally "people of the cities" but in context 
meaning middle classes) provides the foundation and chief cause of politi- 
cal democracy. Barrington Moore is categorical on the subject: "We may 
simply register strong agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous 
and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable ele- 
ment in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeoisie, no 
dem~cracy."~ Thus, according to at least one version of common Western 
theory, economic growth in Taiwan and Korea has probably led to the 
emergence of a middle class in each country and that is why democracy is 
starting to appear there. 
But there are problems with this theory, particularly as it relates to the 
most advanced capitalist countries, the United States and Japan. Ameri- 
can democratic theory does not prescribe any particular level of economic 
development or the existence of a middle class for democracy to flourish. 
Copenhagen Papers 4.89 64 
The Democratization of South Korea: What Role Does Economic Development Play? 
The Americans are, in fact, largely silent on the relationship, if any, be- 
tween economics and democracy. This may, of course, merely reflect 
American myopia. Tocqueville thought that democracy succeeded in 
America for two reasons: the place was naturally rich, and the United 
States lacked a heritage of feudalism. The latter condition was important 
to help distinguish it from Latin America, which was equally rich but a 
failure at democracy. Reflecting on Tocqueville, Arthur Schlesinger came 
to this generalization: "Democracy is unlikely to last without economic 
progress, but economic progress does not guarantee dem~cracy."~ 
Japan appears to be an illustration of Schlesinger's point. Japan's at- 
tempts at democracy, as periodized by Rokuro Hidaka, break down into 
the following pattern of three attempts and three failures: 
First phase: Meiji Restoration, 1868 to c. 1890. A period of 
"enlightenment", with movements towards liberty, people's rights, 
and democracy. 
Second phase: 1890 to c. 1912. A period of nationalism and imperial- 
ism, in which democracy waned. 
Third phase: 1912 to 1931. A period in which attempts were made 
to bring the absolutist system (tennosei) under democratic con- 
straints, known as the era of Taisho Democracy. 
Fourth phase: 1931 to 1945. A period of militarism, ultra-national- 
ism, and the suppression of all democratic tendencies. 
Fifth phase: 1945 to 1960. A period of intense democratization in 
the wake of Japan's defeat and the reforms of the Allied occupa- 
tion. 
Sixth phase: 1960 to the present. A period of high-speed economic 
growth based in part on single-party government and the 
avoidance of political problems. 
Throughout this 120-year period Japan continued to experience signifi- 
cant economic progress, but capitalism in the Japanese form does not 
produce or even seem to need political democracy in order to function. 
Contrary to Western bourgeois theory, capitalism in Japan seems to have 
flourished when democracy was weakest. Hidaka explains: "In the 
prewar period, the state unified the Japanese people by fostering loyalty to 
the Emperor. Today, the state coopts the people by elaborately redistribut- 
ing profits to meet the people's expectations.. . .The high-growth economy 
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made this ability to redistribute profits possible.. . .The postwar period can 
be divided into two phases: the phase of postwar democracy and the 
phase of high economic growth.. . .The high-growth economy of Japan 
which began in the 1960s created a new state completely different in qual- 
ity from the Japanese state during or immediately after the war.'l5 In other 
words, the periods of greatest economic growth in Japan coincide with 
periods of growing authoritarianism, not with periods of democracy, as 
Western theory suggests. 
If the link between economic growth and democracy is problematic, i.e., 
not obvious, and the evidence from the major East Asian cases (Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan) ambiguous, then let me turn to a direct analysis of the 
relationship between economic growth and democracy. First, however, 
what do I mean by democracy? It is necessary to answer this question as 
specifically as possible because the concept of democracy is buried under 
so many layers of philosophy, description, and propaganda as to make it 
almost meaningless. 
I follow I<arl Popper's distillation of the essence of democracy for three 
reasons: (1) it is parsimonious; (2) it does not depend on a particular cul- 
ture or religious heritage (e.g., a Periclean Age, Judeo-Christian ethics, or 
the Natural Law); and (3) it is very relevant to the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy as it is encountered in East Asia today. Pop- 
per writes, "How is the state to be constituted so that bad rulers can be got 
rid of without bloodshed, without violence?. . .The modern so-called 
democracies are all good examples of practical solutions to this pro- 
blem.. ..]They all adopt[ the principle that the government can be dis- 
missed by a majority vote.. ..Nowhere do the people actually rule. It is 
governments that rule, ]including[ our civil servants - or our uncivil 
masters, as Winston Churchill called them.. . .]Democracy thus means[ not 
a theory of the 'rule of the people', but rather the rule of law that postulates 
the bloodless dismissal of the government by a majority ~ote. ' '~  
Popper's principle can be stated positively. What democracy requires is 
the institutionalization of a competitive process by which people choose 
their leaders. Competition involves a rule-bound contest in which both 
sides recognize the legitimacy of the other side's interests and strategies so 
long as both sides obey the rules. Such institutions as the rule of law, bills 
of rights, constitutions, judicial review, and legislative oversight are 
devices to set, maintain, umpire, and when necessary change the rules of 
political competition. Democracy is the set of institutions that allows the 
Copenhagen Papers 4.89 66 
The Democratization of South Korea: What Role Does Economic Development Play? 
citizens to hold their governments accountable for what they have done 
and what they propose to do. Jn a democracy, election day is judgment day. 
Democracy in this specific sense should be distinguished frorn two related 
concepts - namely, pluralism and liberalization. Pluralism refers to a state 
of complexity or diversity in a society that is commonly, but not exclu- 
sively, caused by processes of economic development (it may also be 
caused by immigration, acculturation, regionalism, and other non-eco- 
nomic forces). The advent of a pluralistic society often has the effect of in- 
creasing demands for democracy, since majoritarianism and the con- 
census building it entails coheres better with pluralism than any other 
form of government. Pluralism thus may be a cause of democracy, but not 
all democracies are necessarily pluralistic regimes (e.g., ancient Athens 
was not pluralistic in any contemporary sense of the term). 
Liberalization refers not to pluralism or democratization but to the 
process of granting or establishing rights that protect individuals and so- 
cial groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or other 
citizens. Such rights include habeas corpus, security in one's home, pro- 
tection of private property, guarantee of a fair trial, and freedom of move- 
ment, speech, and religion. These rights may come from tradition, the 
common law, a fundamental grant of liberties such as the Magna Carta 
(1215), struggles between the executive and legislative branches of govern- 
ment, developments in the criminal law, and so forth. 
In very general terms, pluralism promotes demands for liberalization, 
and liberalization is conducive to democratization. The American revolu- 
tion at the end of the eighteenth century, for example, was caused in part 
by a process of liberalization that had gone on for the previous two centu- 
ries. The purpose of the revolution was to establish democracy in order to 
secure preexisting liberal rights against encroachments by (in the eyes of 
the Americans) English tyrants. When democratization takes place before 
the development of either pluralism or liberalization, the resultant 
democracy may fail - as in China in 1912, or most Latin American countries 
during the nineteenth century, or in Korea in 1960-61. But, again, liberali- 
zation is not the same thing as democracy; one may cause the other and 
vice versa. Until very recently both Taiwan and South Korea have been 
more pluralistic and liberal than, for example, mainland China without be- 
ing democracies. 
Keeping these fundamental distinctions in mind, let me try to relate 
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the occurrence of democracy to various economic influences. It is possible 
for democratizing movements to have no connection at all to the economy. 
A people may have ample reasons for wanting to judge and to be rid of its 
government other than for economic reasons: Manila, February 1986, 
offers a good example. But there are cases in which people strive for 
democracy precisely to check the economic power of the state and to ad- 
vance their own economic interests instead. These are the classic cases of 
the West associated with the concept of "bourgeois revolution." In these 
cases the capitalists opposed the monopol or predominance of the state in 
economic affairs; and they were able to prevail against the state because 
they did not require state assistance in capital accumulation or in breaking 
up potentially socialist workers' movements and because the traditional 
landlord class had lost its potency. The industrial bourgeoisie of the West 
thus developed strong economic interests in restricting state power and in 
promoting a laissez faire (i.e, government free) economy, It sought and 
defended democracy as a way to achieve these ends and to prevent politi- 
cal power frombeing used against it by groups with different economic in- 
terests. In this way the concept of democracy came to be associated with 
the interests of the middle class, but it actually refers only to the develop- 
ment of democracy and capitalism in some countries of the West. To make 
a general principle out of the particular bourgeois-democratic relationship 
that developed in Europe in the nineteenth century is to overgeneralize the 
experience of the West -but that is what virtually all Western social science 
theory does. 
The relationship between democracy and the economy obviously 
changes when the state leads economic development, when it directly 
mobilizes and allocates capital, when it licenses or subcontracts its projects 
to private entrepreneurs, and when it plays the predominant role in con- 
trolling the organization of workers. This is the pattern that prevails under 
the "capitalist developmental state'' (CDS), a configuration which Japan 
invented and of which Korea since 1961 is a prime e~ample .~  In these 
cases very high levels of economic development can be achieved without 
eliciting any so-called bourgeois pressure to liberalize or democratize, and 
a collaborative but illiberal relationship between the state and private capi- 
tal can persist for long periods of time. In the CDS, the role of en- 
trepreneurship is largely preempted by the state, and private capitalists in 
effect fulfill contracts authorized by the state. Even so, as the CDS 
progresses to advanced levels of capital-intensive and knowledge-inten- 
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sive industrialization, the resulting high levels of pluralism will create a 
crisis of stability that can lead to democracy. There are various configura- 
tions that this crisis will take, and the process of resolving the crisis has as 
much to do with the occurrence of a democratic or a non-democratic out- 
come as the causes of pluralism itself. Before I turn to those configurations, 
however, let me briefly review the theory of intentional economic develop- 
ment in order to show the place of the CDS in it. 
From a contemporary political economy perspective, the theory of inten- 
tional economic development is composed of four broad elements, the 
most important aspect of which is that they must occur in the following 
order: 1) a receptive social environment; 2) determined leadership; 3) tech- 
nical competence; and 4) money (i.e. capital). The order is important; 
pouring aid money into places without either a receptive social environ- 
ment or determined leadership or technical competence will not produce 
development but only corruption. Let me expand on each of these ele- 
ments. 
The idea of a receptive social environment is the broadest and least well 
formulated aspect of the theory. It is merely a catchall category to take into 
account the influence of cultural factors. The theory argues (or ac- 
knowledges) that intentional development cannot succeed in a culture 
that is hostile to economic activities or is so riven with ethnic, religious, 
caste, or tribal disputes as to put economic affairs on a low priority. Iran 
during and after 1979 offers an example of a culture that stood in the way 
of economic development, as does Spain during much of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Generally speaking, all of the countries of the Si- 
nitic cultural area have societies that are conducive to development, 
although in several cases ideology and extreme forms of nationalism have 
been as severe obstacles to development (e.g., Vietnam, North Korea) as 
culture is elsewhere. 
The second element of the theory, ),determined leadership)), means 
something very specific. It refers to a draconian process of priority setting 
and maintaining. The theory holds that the overall process of develop- 
ment must be disaggregated into economic development, social develop- 
ment, and political development, each of which can be understood in per 
capita terms. Economic development means per capita increases in 
productivity. Social development means per capita increases in such 
measures as life expectancy at birth, basic education, health care, access to 
media of communication, and leisure time. Political development means 
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per capita increases in access to forums where binding decisions for the so- 
ciety as a whole are made. Political development is not synonymous with 
democratization - access and the ability of a majority to dismiss the 
government are not the same - but the existence of democracy is evidence 
of advanced levels of political development. 
The role of leadership in a campaign of intentional development is to 
promote one aspect of development, usually economic development, at 
the expense of the other two. (One can imagine a situation in which first 
priority is given to either political or social development at the expense of 
the other two, but these cases are less common. Mao's policies during the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution are an example of political development be- 
ing advanced at the expense of social and economic development). Giving 
priority to the economic sector requires that the leadership develop intru- 
sive and preemptive capacities that can demobilize the social and political 
sectors while pouring resources into the economic sector. Based on the im- 
portant historical cases (primarily Japan and the USSR), the theory holds 
that only unbalanced schemes of development can succeed. Attempts at 
balanced development will only frustrate all development as resources 
will be spread too thinly into welfare schemes of politically popular 
projects. Determined leadership presupposes the existence of a serious, 
ruthless, informed elite - a Meiji oligarchy, a communist party politburo, 
or a military junta such as that of Park Chung- Hee - that can force these 
priorities on the society. Needless to say, to the extent that the develop- 
mental elite succeeds in its task, it will produce a seriously unbalanced so- 
ciety, one that is highly developed economically, moderately developed 
socially, and deeply underdeveloped politically. It is this imbalance that 
produces the ultimate crisis of legitimacy for developmental elites. 
The third element of the theory, technical competence, refers to the need 
to educate enough members of the society to be able to staff the factories, 
offices, and governmental bureaus of a modern economy. Determined 
leadership without technical competence is not enough; that is what 
mainland China has had since its First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). All of the 
East Asian CDSs are heavy investors in education. Of course, this commit- 
ment to education leads to a contradiction: the greater the degree of educa- 
tion the harder it is to keep the social and political sectors demobilized. A 
strong nationalistic content to the education and controls over private con- 
tacts with the external world can mitigate its effects, however. Both Japan 
and the USSR illustrate the point that the unbalanced configuration even 
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with high levels of education can last longer than many Western critics of 
these systems believe. 
The final element of the theory, money, means that even the society per- 
fectly organized for development must still find, squeeze out, or borrow 
funds that it can invest in more productive facilities. The ultimate need of 
the developing society is capital, that is wealth in whatever form that is not 
consumed but used to produce more wealth. The normal sources of de- 
velopmental capital are forced savings, borrowing, and international aid. 
Another duty of determined leadership is to force savings from the popu- 
lation by restricting its consumption. 
Nation-states undertaking programs of intentional economic develop- 
ment usually do so for non-economic motives - national security, political 
ideology, overcoming neo-colonialism - and are therefore more concerned 
with the effectiveness of their programs than with their efficiency. This is 
one of the reasons that they usually do not pay much attention to the ad- 
vice of professional economists. At some point, however, very inefficient 
schemes of state entrepreneurship become ineffective and must be 
reformed. Generally speaking, there are three broad patterns of state-in- 
itiated economic development - 1) those in which the state monopolizes 
ownership and control of all productive assets, 2) those in which the state 
retains ownership but decentralizes control to the level of enterprises and 
households, and 3) those in which the state eschews ownership but exer- 
cises control through the manipulation of incentives, rationing of resour- 
ces and capital, cartels, and so-called "administrative guidance". Examples 
of the first are the true "command economies" (e.g. the USSR), examples 
of the second are the reformed command economies (e.g. Hungary, main- 
land China), and examples of the third are the CDSs (e.g., Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan). Economies in which both ownership and control are 
in private hands and the state is restricted to a regulatory role approximate 
the laissez faire model of neo-classical economic theory (e.g., the United 
States, Hong Kong). It is also only the latter to which neo-classical eco- 
nomic theory is r e l e ~ a n t . ~  Of these four types the CDS is historically the 
most successful in terms of the levels and pace of economic development 
actually achieved. It is not without its human costs, but in general it is also 
less costly in human suffering than the Soviet-type command e c ~ n o m y . ~  
A successful CDS, that is, one that has broken through to self-sustaining 
economic growth, sooner of later must face a crisis caused by its extreme 
imbalance. Japan during the 1920s displayed this configuration in an acute 
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form: high economic development, fair social development, and poor po- 
litical development. During the decade Japanese elites undertook various 
reforms intended to correct the imbalance in the society, but these were 
eventually overwhelmed by an international crisis. There is nothing pre- 
determined about the outcome of the crisis of imbalance: it may lead to 
renewed authoritarianism (as in Japan in the 1930s), it may lead to 
democratization (perhaps contemporary Spain and Portugal are exam- 
ples), and it may lead to an indefinite postponement of any resolution so 
long as the elites are able to ))manage(( the crisis (e.g. Russia under Brezh- 
nev, Japan today).'' 
The breakdown of authoritarian regimes is contingent on a host of fac- 
tors. One of the most important is leadership errors by the elite that make 
the crisis situation worse. This is the most common final cause of revolu- 
tion." If, for example, the elite is constituted as an exclusive body, e.g., a 
military elite, it cannot use its greatest potential weapon in attempting to 
defuse the situation - namely cooption of protest leaders into the status 
quo elite. The Mexican ruling party has used this gambit for years, and the 
Kuomintang in Taiwan has largely defused the Taiwanese separatist issue 
by coopting Taiwanese into the party and the government. A regime that 
cannot coopt protesters is much more fragile than one that can. Some clas- 
sic examples of leadership errors that deepened the crisis include Louis 
XVI's calling the estates general in 1789; Ferdinand Marcos calling a snap 
election in February 1986; and Chun Doo-Hwan's decision of April 13, 
1987, to suspend further debate on the Korean Constitution. 
The transition from authoritarian rule to more popular forms of govern- 
ment, when it occurs, usually occurs for one of three reasons. The first is 
international factors, commonly defeat in war. Japan owes its democracy 
today to its loss of a big war to the right people at the right time. Similarly, 
contemporary Argentine democracy came about because Argentina lost 
the Falklands War, thereby discrediting its military regime. The second 
reason is a decision unilaterally by the authoritarian regime to liberalize, 
which often leads to democratization. It may do so because it recognizes 
that the success of its economic developmelit program has produced many 
medium and smaller enterprises that are beyond its control. Both because 
it trusts the moderation of these bourgeois forces and to avoid seeing them 
radicalized, the regime decides to liberalize. Something like this is occur- 
ring in Taiwan today. The third reason for the transition is the develop- 
ment of a true revolutionary situation. These cases will be resolved either 
Copenhagen Papers 4.89 72 
The Democratization of South Korea: What Role Does Economic Development Play? 
through revolutionary violence or else one side or the other, usually the 
one with the least legitimacy, will back down and undertake reforms. 
South Korea offers a vivid illustration of these generalizations about in- 
tentional economic development and the crisis of unbalanced develop- 
ment that it produces when it succeeds. Let me therefore try to place the 
Republic of Korea in the perspective outlined here. All CDSs are autho- 
ritarian (explicitly or covertly) but not all authoritarian regimes are CDSs. 
Some authoritarian regimes are merely preservative.12 South Korea has 
experienced both kinds: under the First Republic of Syngman Rhee 
(1948-50) and under the Third (1962-72) and Fourth Republics (1972-80) of 
Park Chung-Hee. The Masan Revolution of April 19,1960, that overthrew 
Rhee was a straight-forward democratic revolution without economic 
causes. It has strong similarities to the Aquino Revolution of 1986 in the 
Philippines and illustrates again that a people may want democracy - the 
ability to dismiss their government bloodlessly - regardless of their eco- 
nomic interests. Nonetheless, the Korean revolution of 1960 was important 
for later events because of the dramaturgy and precedents it established: 
it was led by students, a major student martyr was created (in 1960 Kim 
Chu-Yo1 was tortured to death by the police just as in 1987 Park Jong-Chul 
died under similar circumstances), and authoritarian arrogance inflamed 
nonparticipants and caused them to rally behind the students. 
The 1960 revolution and the subsequent 1961 military coup d'etat led to 
the creation in South Korea of a true CDS. Between 1962 and 1987 the 
Korean economy grew at an average rate of 8.9 percent per year, and for the 
years 1986 and 1987 it grew at 12.6 percent and 12.3 percent respectively. 
These growth rates have political significance in that they show that Korea 
could afford to bring its CDS into greater balance even if that caused its 
growth rate to fallinto the 6 to 8 percent range. This economic development 
had the effect of shifting the composition of the Korean labor force from 79 
percent engaged in the primary sector in 1961 to 70 percent engaged in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors in 1988. Nontheless, this shift did not 
produce a large middle class independent of the state, as in Taiwan, be- 
cause the Korean CDS followed the Japanese model closely in its reliance 
on large, state-supported conglomerates (zaibatsu in Japan, chaebol in 
Korea). Professor Kim Kyong-Dong notes the political consequences: 
"The entrepreneurial-managerial elite initially emerged in the early 
period of the new republic in close collaboration with the politico- 
bureaucratic sector, and has maintained the relationship essentially the 
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same way throughout ... .The role played by the entrepreneurial- 
managerial sector as far as the process of political democratization is con- 
cerned has been at most passive, if not negative. By actively leading the 
way to economic growth, it has provided soil for rising aspirations among 
the people for greater amounts of democracy. Nontheless, this sector has 
not actively sought to persuade the governing politico-bureaucratic elite to 
pursue democratization programs."13 So much for the Western theory of a 
middle class vanguard leading the way to democracy. 
One important difference between the Korean CDS and military re- 
gimes in South America is that General Park civilianized his junta and 
operated the CDS under a facade of democracy and constitutionalism. 
Park and his allies replaced their uniforms with civilian clothes, and they 
worked through political parties (the Democratic Republican Party and its 
contemporary successor, the Democratic Justice Party) to control the Na- 
tional assembly. Equally important, Korea's generals-turned-politicians 
placed their cadres in the party and the secret police, and they dominated 
the armed forces, not the other way around. In Latin America the survival 
of the government run by generals depended almost entirely om the sup- 
port of fellow military officers. Park's civilian front allowed him to coopt 
many technical elites, including those educated abroad. When the crisis of 
imbalance came to Korea, it did not directly discredit the armed forces 
thereby allowing them to remain neutral. 
The crisis in Korea was precipitated by the February 1985 elections for the 
National Assembly, in which the New Korea Democratic Party, led by I<im 
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, emerged as the largest and most articulate 
force in the legislature. And this election was in turn conditioned by the 
approach of the 24th Olympiad, scheduled for Seoul in 1988, which fo- 
cused international attention on Korea's economic successes and its politi- 
cal shortcomings. Sensing that he could not reestablish the bases of 
legitimacy of the Park regime for his own government, President Chun 
tried to win popular endorsement through support of Korean national- 
ism. Clearly he could not take credit for economic development (Chunrs 
coup of 1980 had, in fact, threatened it), and the alleged threat from the 
North was beginning to wear thin as an excuse for military rule in the 
South. Thus, Chun sponsored Korean nationalism in the form of the 
Asian Games of 1986 and the Seoul Olympics of 1988. 
The Olympics proved to be a great constraint, opening a window of op- 
portunity for protest. If the government had declared martial law to stop 
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the protests, which began in 1985, the International Olympic Committee 
would have beenforced to shift the games elsewhere. That would have hu- 
miliated the nation and discredited Chun. Thus the demonstrations went 
ahead in favor of a constitutional amendment authorizing the direct elec- 
tion of the president. The intent of this change was to prevent Chun and 
his colleagues from perpetuating their rule through a Japanese-style sin- 
gle-party regime. In order to stop the demonstrations, Chun in April 1986 
unexpectedly made a concession and declared that he would support any 
constitutional change endorsed by the National Assembly, where his 
party had de facto control. Chun himself promised to leave office in Febru- 
ary 1988 in any case. 
This concession ended the demonstrations and led to protracted squab- 
bling and ultimate deadlock among the various political parties and fac- 
tions. Then Chun misread the public mood and made a fatal blunder. 
Hoping to reverse his earlier concession and using the Olympics and his 
own departure from office as excuses, on April 13, 1987, President Chun 
said that he had decided nto put constitutional change on hold.(( A month 
later, on June 10, the national convention of the Democratic Justice Party 
nominated former general Roh Tae-Woo as its candidate to succeed Chun 
in an indirect election. The country erupted in violent street demonstra- 
tions. A revolutionary situation existed in the sense that the protesters 
sensed public support shifting to their side and the government dared not 
use its ultimate weapons of coercion, the armed forces, because that would 
also have scuttled the Olympics. On June 29 candidate Roh split with 
Chun, accepted the opposition's demands for constitutional reform and 
an end to police surveillance of opposition politicians, and promised in- 
vestigations of long- standing grievances. It was a masterful political move. 
The subsequent presidential election of December 16, 1987, and the par- 
liamentary elections of April 26, 1988, ended the authoritarian regime in 
Korea, ushered in the Sixth Republic, and inaugurated parliamentary 
democracy. 
What are its chances of surviving? In a broad socioeconomic sense 
chances are good because the Korean CDS was badly imbalanced and its 
degree of development and the consequent pluralism of the society called 
for compensatory political development. But the relationship between 
economic and political development is in no sense deterministic. There are 
several contingent factors, some working for Korean democracy and some 
working against it. Among the negative factors one is that the vanguards 
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in the street battles of June 1987 were composed almost entirely of students 
and not substantial elements of the middle class. Student nationalism in 
Korea goes back at least to the 1919 demonstrations against the Japanese 
occupation, and it is therefore autonomous from the changes wrought by 
Korea's economic development. Given enough time the student move- 
ment will probably break down from within, particularly as it comes more 
to be dominated by intransigent radicals (the Minmintu, Sanmintu, and 
Chamintu factions). There may not be enough time, however, given that 
politically and economically Korea cannot afford the luxury of ceaseless 
street battles.14 
One possible solution would be an American military withdrawal from 
Korea, which would defuse the main nationalistic issue that the students 
are attempting to exploit (American pressure for Korean reciprocity in 
terms of market access, the belief that the U.S. tacitly supported the Chun 
regime, including its use of force at Kwangju in May 1980, and the feeling 
that the American presence blocks progress toward negotiations with the 
North and improved relations with the Communist nations). Korea no 
longer needs American ground forces based inside the country to guaran- 
tee its security, and the growth of the Korean economy has caused the mili- 
tary budget to drop from 6 percent to 5 percent of GNP even as it is being 
expanded, American withdrawal could save the United States as much as 
$23 billion per annum, an important consideration given the American fis- 
cal imbalances, and guarantees of air and naval protection from American 
forces in the area could be continued. Perhaps most seriously, a continued 
presence of American ground forces inside Korea could damage Korean 
democracy because it both fuels student nationalism and continues 
Korea's dependent position as an American protectorate. The case for 
American withdrawal is strong.15 
Another negative factor in preserving Korean democracy is the apparent 
unwillingness of all parties in Korean politics to abide by the rules of 
democratic competition and to compromise their differences. Even 
though Roh Tae-Woo made the first compromise in his historic declaration 
of June 29,1987, his subsequent cabinet appointments of December 19 and 
his forcing through a new election law at 210 AM March 18 revived fears 
among the public that the government hopes to rig democratic proce- 
dures. Equally seriously, the inability of the opposition to unite behind 
principles rather than personalities and the extreme regionalism dis- 
played in the elections of April 26 suggests that democracy may only be a 
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slogan among many opposition politicians. If the Korean National Assem- 
bly, much like the Japanese Diet, proves unable to supervise and hold ac- 
countable Korea's formidable bureaucracy, democracy may prove to be 
only formal and empty. 
On the positive side, the election of April 26 advanced the chances of po- 
litical stability because it brought all the major dissidents and critics of the 
government into +the National Assembly. If the government party had 
triumphed, this would have produced an explosive polarization in society 
between the ins and the outs. The election, together with the discrediting 
of ex-president Chun following the arrest in March 1988 of his brother on 
corruption charges, means that the National Assembly has become the lo- 
cus of Korean politics. Behind the scenes manipulation has become less 
important than parliamentary politics. Parliament is the great school of 
democracy, and Korea now has a healthy one. 
A final factor working in favor of Korean democratization is that the peo- 
ple took direct action in a revolutionary situation and forced political re- 
form. It was not something bestowed by a foreign conqueror (as in Japan) 
or from above by a liberalizing but still dominant elite (as in Taiwan). A per- 
sistent source of weakness in Japanese democracy is the feeling that it lacks 
grass roots. This shows up in many different places in Japan. In Christena 
Turner's study of labor disputes, for example, one labor leader said to her 
that the problem with democracy in Japanese unions is the same as for 
democracy in Japan as a whole: 
The Japanese people never fought for democracy. They have never 
had to insist on their rights to participation. It was handed to them 
by the Americans and now we are all trying to make it work. But 
unless you know how to insist, how to fight, on your own behalf it 
can't really work.16 
The best thing going for democracy in Korea is that the people themselves 
were involved in its creation and have a stake in its survival. 
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